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Summary. The dissemination of synthetic data can be an effective means of making
information from sensitive data publicly available while reducing the risk of disclosure
associated with releasing the sensitive data directly. While mechanisms exist for synthesizing
data that satisfy formal privacy guarantees, the utility of the synthetic data is often an
afterthought. More recently, the use of methods from the disease mapping literature has
been proposed to generate spatially-referenced synthetic data with high utility, albeit without
formal privacy guarantees. The objective for this paper is to help bridge the gap between
the disease mapping and the formal privacy literatures. In particular, we extend an existing
approach for generating formally private synthetic data to the case of Poisson-distributed
count data in a way that allows for the infusion of prior information. To evaluate the
utility of the synthetic data, we conducted a simulation study inspired by publicly available,
county-level heart disease-related death counts. The results of this study demonstrate that
the proposed approach for generating differentially private synthetic data outperforms a
popular technique when the counts correspond to events arising from subgroups with unequal
population sizes or unequal event rates.
Key words: Bayesian methods, Confidentiality, Data suppression, Disclosure risk,
Spatial data, Uncertainty
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1 Introduction
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s “Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemio-
logic Research” (CDC WONDER) is a web-based tool for the dissemination of epidemiologic
data collected by the National Vital Statistics System. Via CDC WONDER, researchers
can obtain detailed tables such as the number of deaths attributed to a specific cause of
death (i.e., ICD code) in a given county and a given year by demographic variables such
as age, race, and sex, subject to restrictions on small counts (CDC, 2003). Unfortunately,
such suppression techniques have been shown to be susceptible to certain types of targeted
attacks (e.g., Dinur and Nissim, 2003; Holan et al., 2010; Quick et al., 2015), thus motivating
alternative methods for releasing public-use data with formal privacy guarantees with respect
to the disclosure of sensitive information.
A popular approach for statistical disclosure limitation is the release of synthetic data,
as first proposed by Rubin (1993) and Little (1993). Specifically, if y = (y1, . . . , yI)
T
denotes a restricted-use dataset of I potentially sensitive observations, a synthetic dataset,
z = (z1, . . . , zI)
T , can be generated by first fitting a statistical model, p (y |θ), to the
restricted-use data, obtaining the posterior distribution for the model’s parameters, θ, and
then generating z from the posterior predictive distribution, p (z |y) = ∫ p (z |y,θ) p (θ |y) dθ.
When multiple synthetic datasets, z(m) for m = 1, . . . ,M , are released, inference can then be
made using the combining rules introduced by Raghunathan et al. (2003) and Reiter (2003),
which allow the uncertainty due to imputation to be accounted for (Reiter, 2002). Due to the
flexible nature of producing synthetic data, models for data synthesis are often designed to
accommodate complex data structures (e.g., Reiter, 2005; Hu et al., 2018; Manrique-Vallier
and Hu, 2018). A recent example of this is the work of Quick and Waller (2018), which
proposed the use of models from the disease mapping literature to generate synthetic data,
using ten years of stroke mortality data obtained from CDC WONDER as an illustrative
example. A more complete overview of synthetic data can be found in Drechsler (2011).
While the risk of disclosure associated with the release of synthetic data is an active area
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of research (e.g., Reiter and Mitra, 2009; Quick et al., 2018; Hu, 2018), the drawback of
many of the aforementioned approaches is the lack of formal privacy guarantees, such as the
concept of differential privacy (Dwork, 2006). Specifically, if y denotes the true count data, a
synthetic dataset z is -differentially private if for any hypothetical dataset x = (x1, . . . , xI)
T
with ‖x− y‖1 = 2 and
∑
i xi =
∑
i yi — i.e., there exists i and i
′ such that xi = yi − 1 and
xi′ = yi′ + 1 with all other values equal — then
∣∣∣∣log p (z |y,θ)p (z |x,θ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ . (1)
While θ can be viewed as a vector of model parameters, in practice the elements of θ are
specified in order to satisfy -differential privacy. While it would be impossible to exhaustively
list the various mechanisms designed to satisfy (1) — though Bowen and Liu (2018) provides
an excellent review — many are based on adding noise from a Laplace (Dwork et al., 2006),
exponential (McSherry and Talwar, 2007), or geometric distribution (Ghosh et al., 2012).
Properties of differentially private mechanisms from a statistical prospective are discussed by
Wasserman and Zhou (2010).
The first production system to use differential privacy was the Census Bureau’s OnTheMap
— a mapping program for disseminating information about commuting patterns in the United
States — which was based on the framework proposed by Machanavajjhala et al. (2008). In
particular, the data underlying OnTheMap are based on individual-level pairs of origin and
destination Census blocks; for each destination block, Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) modeled
the number of people commuting from each of the roughly 8 million Census blocks using a
multinomial likelihood with a Dirichlet prior. The authors then demonstrated that when
this prior was sufficiently informative, synthetic data generated from the posterior predictive
distribution would satisfy -differential privacy. In addition to OnTheMap, differentially
private methods have been implemented by Google (Erlingsson et al., 2014), Apple (Apple
Computer, 2017), and Microsoft (Ding et al., 2017). Moreover, the U.S. Census Bureau
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recently announced (Abowd, 2018) that the 2018 End-to-End Census Test would be protected
using differential privacy with an eye toward its use for the full 2020 Census. A discussion of
the challenges this process has entailed is provided by Garfinkel et al. (2018).
While data on CDC WONDER can be thought of in terms of a contingency table (e.g.,
county× age-group) with a multinomial distribution where the goal would be to estimate the
probability of an event occurring in a given cell, it’s more common in the disease mapping
literature to model the counts using a Poisson distribution (e.g., Brillinger, 1986) where the
goal would be to make inference on the group-specific mortality rates at the county level. For
instance, while Clayton and Kaldor (1987) represents an early, empirical Bayesian approach,
the conditional autoregressive (CAR) model of Besag et al. (1991) and its multivariate
extension — the multivariate CAR (MCAR) of Gelfand and Vounatsou (2003) — have served
as the basis for fully Bayesian advances in spatial statistics in recent years (e.g., Bradley
et al., 2015; Datta et al., 2017; Quick et al., 2017).
The objective for this paper is to help bridge the gap between the disease mapping and
differential privacy literatures. Whereas Quick and Waller (2018) proposed the use of standard
disease mapping models to generate synthetic data without formal privacy protections, our
goal here is to extend the formal privacy protections introduced by Machanavajjhala et al.
(2008) to the setting of Poisson-distributed count data. Full details of the methods explored in
this paper are described in Section 2 — this includes both background information regarding
the multinomial-Dirichlet model proposed by Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) and the Poisson-
gamma model proposed here. To compare and contrast these two approaches, we have
conducted a simulation study in Section 3 based on heart disease mortality data from U.S.
counties. In particular, we will explore the effect of heterogeneity in population sizes and the
underlying event rates on the utility of the synthetic data produced by these approaches. We
then provide concluding remarks and discuss avenues for future research in this area.
3
2 Methods
For the following presentation, we let yi denote the number of events belonging to group
i out of a population of size ni, for i = 1, . . . , I and I ≥ 2. While individual yi is deemed
potentially sensitive, we assume y· =
∑
i yi > 0 is not sensitive and thus is publicly available.
2.1 Multinomial-Dirichlet model
To model y, one option is to assume y |θ ∼ Mult (y·,θ) and further assume that θ ∼ Dir (α),
where α = (α1, . . . , αI)
T is a vector of hyperparameters to be defined shortly. To generate
a synthetic data vector, z = (z1, . . . , zI)
T , with a given
∑
i zi = z· = y·, one can first
draw a sample, θ∗, from the posterior distribution for θ — i.e., θ |y ∼ Dir (y + α) — and
then sample z from the posterior predictive distribution, p (z |y,θ,α), by sampling from
z ∼ Mult (z·,θ∗). This is equivalent to integrating θ out of the model and sampling z from
p (z |y,α) =
∫
p (z |θ,α)× p (θ |y,α) dθ
=
∫
z·!∏
zi!
×
∏
θzii ×
Γ (
∑
yi + αi)∏
Γ (yi + αi)
×
∏
θyi+αi−1i dθ
=
z·!∏
zi!
× Γ (
∑
yi + αi)∏
Γ (yi + αi)
×
∫ ∏
θzi+yi+αi−1i dθ
=
z·!∏
zi!
× Γ (
∑
yi + αi)∏
Γ (yi + αi)
×
∏
Γ (zi + yi + αi)
Γ (
∑
zi + yi + αi)
. (2)
For the data synthesizer in (2) to satisfy -differential privacy, we must satisfy the definition
in (1) — i.e., we require
∣∣∣∣log(p (z |y,α)p (z |x,α)
)∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣log(∏Γ (αi + xi)∏Γ (αi + yi) ×
∏
Γ (zi + αi + yi)∏
Γ (zi + αi + xi)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ , (3)
for an I-vector of hypothetical data, x, such that ‖x− y‖1 = 2 and
∑
i xi =
∑
i yi. Without
loss of generality, we assume the only differences in x and y exist between the pairs (x1, x2)
and (y1, y2) and furthermore that x1 = y1−1 and x2 = y2 +1. This implies that the expression
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in (3) can be further simplified as
p (z |y,α)
p (z |x,α) =
α1 + y1
α2 + y2 − 1 ×
z2 + α2 + y2 − 1
z1 + α1 + y1
. (4)
We now wish to maximize and minimize (4) for z1 + z2 ≤ z·. To maximize (4), we let z1 = 0
and z2 = z·, which implies that (4) is maximized when y2 = 1. Similarly, to minimize (4), we
let z2 = 0 and z1 = z·, which implies that (4) is minimized when y1 = 0. That is,
α1
z· + α1
≤ p (z |y,α)
p (z |x,α) ≤
z· + α2
α2
,
and thus to satisfy -differential privacy, we require
 = log
z· + minαi
minαi
=⇒ minαi ≥ z·
exp ()− 1 . (5)
As discussed in Machanavajjhala et al. (2008), the restriction on α in (5) is often overly
strict. For instance, suppose we wish to synthesize z· = 10,000 events and allocate them across
the approximately I = 3,000 counties in the U.S. If we let  = 7, the result from (5) would
require each αi ≥ 9.12. Considering that this is nearly three times the average number of
events per county (10,000/3,000 = 3.33) — and considering that Dwork (2006) recommends
selecting  < 1 — it would seem that (5) requires us to use very informative priors to achieve
even modest levels of differential privacy. Furthermore, as the probability of generating a
synthetic dataset with all of the events in a single cell — i.e., zi = z· and zi′ = 0 for i′ 6= i —
is extremely low, our concern for such extreme scenarios may be misplaced. As a result of
this limitation of pure differential privacy, Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) proposed a relaxed
definition of differential privacy referred to as (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy in which
a synthesizer satisfies -differential privacy with probability 1 − δ for , δ > 0. While an
(, δ)-probabilistic differentially private synthesizer will produce data with greater utility, an
alternative that satisfies pure -differential privacy (i.e., δ = 0) will be discussed in Section 4.
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2.2 Poisson-gamma synthesizer
A key drawback of generating synthetic data from the model in (2) is that, a priori, each
individual event has an equal probability of being assigned to any group. This ignores
potential heterogeneity in group-specific population sizes and geographic variation in event
rates. To address these limitations, we instead consider the case where
yi |λi ∼ Pois (niλi) and λi ∼ Gamma (ai, bi) , (6)
where λi denotes the event rate in group i and ai and bi denote group-specific hyperparameters.
In particular, we can consider ai a measure of the informativeness of the gamma prior in (6)
and use bi to control E [λi] = ai/bi; the default choice would be to let E [λi] = y·/n· — the
overall average rate — and thus let bi = ain·/y·. We can also infuse prior information into
our specification of E [λi]. As we will illustrate in Section 3, this can improve the utility of
our synthetic data, though as discussed in Section 4, this has implications with respect to
the privacy budget. Using Bayes Theorem, it is straightforward to show that
λi | yi ∼ Gamma (yi + ai, ni + bi) , (7)
and thus that
p (zi | yi, ai, bi) =
∫
Pois (zi |niλi)×Gamma (λi | yi + ai, ni + bi) dλi
=
Γ (zi + yi + ai)
zi!× Γ (yi + ai)
(
ni
bi + 2 ∗ ni
)zi ( bi + ni
bi + 2 ∗ ni
)yi+ai
, (8)
which implies zi | yi, ai, bi ∼ NegBin (yi + ai, ni/ (bi + 2 ∗ ni)). While the posterior predictive
distribution for zi in (8) is sufficient for synthesizing a collection of independent, unconstrained
zi, we desire the distribution for z conditioned on
∑
i zi = z·. Without loss of generality, if we
restrict our focus to the case where I = 2 (i.e., region i versus not region i), the distribution
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we desire is instead
p (z |y, a,b, z·) =
Γ(z1+y1+a1)
z1!
(
n1
b1+2∗n1
)z1 × Γ(z2+y2+a2)
z2!
(
n2
b2+2∗n2
)z2
∑z·
z=0
Γ(z+y1+a1)
z!
(
n1
b1+2∗n1
)z
× Γ(z·−z+y2+a2)
(z·−z)!
(
n2
b2+2∗n2
)(z·−z) . (9)
Unfortunately, further simplification of the denominator in (9) appears non-trivial, as demon-
strated by Lemma 1:
Lemma 1. Let z·, c1, and c2 be positive integers and let p > 0 and q > 0. Then
z·∑
z=0
Γ (z + c1)
z!
× Γ (z· − z + c2)
(z· − z)! p
zq(z·−z) =
dc1−1
dpc1−1
dc2−1
dqc2−1
pc1−1qz·+c2 − pz·+c1qc2−1
q − p .
Thus, when c1 = y1 + a1 and/or c2 = y2 + a2 are large, closed-form expressions for the
denominator in (9) may not be tractable, complicating our ability to specify criteria for a and
b that will result in an -differentially private z. See Appendix A for a proof of Lemma 1.
2.2.1 Requirements to satisfy differential privacy
To satisfy -differential privacy, we need to evaluate the ratio p (z |y, a,b, z·) /p (z |x, a,b, z·)
where x = (x1, x2)
T represents a set of hypothetical data such that ‖x− y‖1 = 2; i.e.,
p (z |y, a,b)
p (z |x, a,b) =
Γ(z1+y1+a1)
z1!
(
n1
b1+2∗n1
)z1×Γ(z2+y2+a2)
z2!
(
n2
b2+2∗n2
)z2
∑z·
z=0
Γ(z+y1+a1)
z!
(
n1
b1+2∗n1
)z×Γ(z·−z+y2+a2)
(z·−z)!
(
n2
b2+2∗n2
)z·−z
Γ(z1+x1+a1)
z1!
(
n1
b1+2∗n1
)z1×Γ(z2+x2+a2)
z2!
(
n2
b2+2∗n2
)z2
∑z·
z=0
Γ(z+x1+a1)
z!
(
n1
b1+2∗n1
)z×Γ(z·−z+x2+a2)
(z·−z)!
(
n2
b2+2∗n2
)z·−z
=
C (x,n, a,b, z·)
C (y,n, a,b, z·)
× Γ (z1 + y1 + a1)
Γ (z1 + x1 + a1)
Γ (z2 + y2 + a2)
Γ (z2 + x2 + a2)
, (10)
where
C (y,n, a,b, z·) =
z·∑
z=0
Γ (z + y1 + a1)
z!
Γ (z· − z + y2 + a2)
(z· − z)! × r1 (n,b)
z , (11)
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and ri (n,b) =
(
b(i)/n(i) + 2
)
/ (bi/ni + 2) where the subscript (i) denotes not i. As in
Section 2.1, we now look to maximize and minimize the expression in (10). As a result of
Lemma 1, convenient expressions for C (x,n, a,b, z·) /C (y,n, a,b, z·) do not exist. Instead,
however, we can consider upper and lower bounds on this ratio.
Theorem 1. Let C (y,n, a,b, z·) be as defined in (11) and let x = (x1, x2)
T and y = (y1, y2)
T
denote vectors of non-negative integers of length 2 such that xi = yi − 1 and xi′ = yi′ + 1
for i, i′ ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= i′ and x1 + x2 = y1 + y2 = z· and let dxe+ = max (x, 0). Then when
ai + yi < ai′ + yi′,
∣∣∣∣log C (x,n, a,b, z·)C (y,n, a,b, z·)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣log z· × d1− ri (n,b)e+ + ai′ + yi′ai + yi − 1
∣∣∣∣ .
See Appendix B for a proof for Theorem 1 and an assessment of the bound’s accuracy.
We will now look to maximize the ratio in (10) using the result from Theorem 1 assuming
(without loss of generality) that a1 ≤ a2 and letting x1 = y1 − 1 and x2 = y2 + 1. From
Theorem 1, we have
p (z |y, a,b)
p (z |x, a,b) ≤
z· × d1− ri (n,b)e+ + a2 + y2
a1 + y1 − 1 ×
(z1 + a1 + y1 − 1)
(z2 + a2 + y2)
, (12)
which is maximized when z1 = z·, z2 = 0, y1 = 1, and y2 = y· − 1, yielding
p (z |y, a,b)
p (z |x, a,b) ≤
z· × d1− ri (n,b)e+ + a2 + y· − 1
a2 + y· − 1 ×
z· + a1
a1
. (13)
Similarly, it can be shown that
p (z |y, a,b)
p (z |x, a,b) ≥
a2 + y· − 1
z· × d1− ri (n,b)e+ + a2 + y· − 1 ×
a1
z· + a1
,
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and thus if we wish to satisfy -differential privacy, we require
log
[
z· × d1− r1 (n,b)e+ + a2 + y· − 1
a2 + y· − 1 ×
z· + a1
a1
]
= log
[
ν1 × z· + a1
a1
]
≤ , (14)
which implies
ai ≥ νi × z·
e − νi =
z·
e/νi − 1 (15)
where νi denotes what amounts to a penalty term associated with the additional information
gained from using the Poisson-gamma model compared to the multinomial-Dirichlet model.
Note that in practice, νi ∈ (1, 2] because z· = y· and a2 ≥ 1. Furthermore, since we will often
consider ai versus a(i), with ai ≈ a and a(i) ≈ (I − 1) a for all i, νi → 1 as a increases. Finally,
note that if bi/ni = b/n for some constants b, n > 0 for all i, then the restriction in (14) is
equivalent to the restriction from the multinomial-Dirichlet model in (5). Thus, only modest
values of  may result in synthetic data that respect the nuances of the true underlying data.
3 Simulation Study
To evaluate the performance of the proposed Poisson-gamma synthesizer, we will conduct a
simulation study based on the heart disease mortality data described in Section 3.1. The
design of the simulation study and the measures used to assess the performance are described
in Section 3.2. In particular, our focus will be on the extent to which potentially important
epidemiologic associations from the true data are retained in the synthetic data. The results
from this comparison are then described in Section 3.3.
3.1 Underlying data
The dataset used to illustrate the properties of the proposed methodology is comprised of the
number of heart disease-related deaths and corresponding population sizes in the counties of
9
the contiguous U.S. for those aged 35 and older — divided into 10-year age groups — during
the year 1980, where deaths due to heart disease are defined as those for which the underlying
cause of death was “diseases of the heart” according to the 9th revision of the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD; ICD–9: 390–398, 402, 404–429). Because these data are
from before the CDC’s suppression guidelines (CDC, 2003) went into effect, the public-use
data are free of suppression and can be obtained via CDC WONDER (CDC/NCHS, 2003).
Furthermore, as there were several changes in county definitions during the 1980s, this choice
of data from 1980 allows us to use readily-available shapefiles from the Census Bureau for
the I = 3,109 counties (or county equivalents) in the contiguous U.S. Letting y†ia denote the
true number of deaths in county i in age group a from a population of size n†ia, we then
follow the approach of Besag et al. (1991) and Gelfand and Vounatsou (2003) — i.e., we
assume y†ia ∼ Pois
(
n†iaλia
)
, where log λia ∼ Norm (β0a + φia, τ 2a ), and φ ∼ MCAR (G) —
and consider the posterior medians of the λia — denoted λ
†
ia — as the “true” mortality rates
for the remainder of our simulation study.
From this point forward, we focus our attention on synthesizing data for the y·1 =
∑
i y
†
i1 =
11,364 deaths from those aged 35–44; additional results are provided in Appendix C for older
age groupings where death counts tend to be higher. As such, we suppress the age subscript
and let y· and n· refer to the number of deaths and total population size for those aged 35–44.
3.2 Simulation study design and evaluation
To compare and contrast the properties of the differentially private synthesizers described
in Section 2, our simulation study investigates four scenarios. In particular, we will explore
the impact of heterogeneity in the population sizes (yes/no) and heterogeneity in the true
underlying event rates (yes/no). To explore heterogeneity in population sizes, we will compare
the results from letting ni vary according to the age 35–44 population distribution from
1980 — i.e., ni = n
†
i — to letting all ni = n·/I, the average population size. To explore
heterogeneity in event rates, we will compare results from letting λi correspond to the
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posterior medians from the heart disease death data described in Section 3.1 — i.e., λi = λ
†
i
— to a scenario in which all λi = y·/n·, the mortality rate of the contiguous U.S. For each
scenario, L = 200 datasets, y(`), will be generated from a Poisson distribution with mean
niλi under the constraint that
∑
i y
(`)
i = y·. From each y
(`) in each scenario, we will use the
following synthesis approaches: (a) the multinomial-Dirichlet model, (b) the Poisson-gamma
model with smoothing toward the national average, and (c) the Poisson-gamma model with
smoothing toward the state averages. This will be repeated for various levels of .
To compare the various approaches, we first recall that in (6) we assumed yi |λi ∼
Pois (niλi). Thus, assuming independence between the yi (conditional on λ), the joint
distribution of y conditioned on λ and
∑
i yi = y· is
y |λ,
∑
i
yi = y· ∼ Mult
(
y·,
{
niλi/
∑
j
njλj
})
.
That is, niλi/
∑
j njλj is the probability of an event occurring in (or in the case of the
synthetic data, being assigned to) county i under the Poisson-gamma model. Thus, if we
assume y· ≈
∑
j njλj , any differences between the synthetic data generated from the Poisson-
gamma model and those from the multinomial-Dirichlet model can be attributed to differences
between λi and θiy·/ni. As such, the utility assessment conducted in the simulation study
will be done using posterior samples from these parameters rather than the synthetic data
themselves. In each scenario and for each approach, we will compute the root mean square
error (rMSE) — e.g.,
rMSE
(
λ(`) |λ
)
=
√√√√ I∑
i=1
(
λ
(`)
i − λi
)2
/I
for ` = 1, . . . , L. We will multiply the rMSE’s by 100,000 (i.e., the typical scale for mortality
rates) and present the results with 95% confidence bands based on the L simulated datasets.
In addition, we will evaluate the urban-rural disparity (where a county is considered “urban”
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if its true 35+ population size is greater than 50,000) and a comparison of the mortality rates
in the states of New Mexico and New York.
3.3 Simulation results
Figure 1 displays the estimated rMSE’s for all four scenarios. Here, we see that when each
county shares the same ni and λi (Figure 1(a)), the multinomial-Dirichlet model and the
Poisson-gamma model that smooths toward the national average yield equivalent results
and both slightly outperform the Poisson-gamma approach that smooths toward the state-
specific averages as  decreases. Similarly, when the population sizes are the same but the
λi’s are allowed to vary (Figure 1(c)), the edge goes to the Poisson-gamma approach that
smooths toward the state-specific means by a small margin. When ni is allowed to vary,
however, the rMSE’s from both of the Poisson-gamma models dominate those from the
multinomial-Dirichlet model, even for large .
In retrospect, it is clear why this occurs. When all counties share the same population size,
the multinomial-Dirichlet model with αi = α is mathematically equivalent to the Poisson-
gamma model with λi = y·/n· and ai = a. To see why the multinomial-Dirichlet model
performs poorly compared to the Poisson-gamma models when the population sizes vary, we
look to the expected values for the synthetic data. Under the multinomial-Dirichlet approach
from Section 2.1,
E [zi |y,α] = E (E [zi |θ] |y,α) = E [θiz· |y,α] = yi + αi∑
j yj + αj
z· → αi∑
j αj
z· =
z·
I
; (16)
i.e., as αi → ∞, the events will become uniformly distributed among the I counties. In
contrast, if z· = y· and
∑
j njλj ≈ y·, the expected value for zi under the Poisson-gamma
model from Section 2.2 yields
E [zi |y, a,b] = E (E [zi |λ] |y, a,b) = E
[
niλi∑
j njλj
z· |y, a,b
]
≈ yi + ai
ni + bi
ni → niλ0i; (17)
12
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Figure 1: Root mean square error from simulation study.
i.e., as ai, bi →∞, the events will be distributed in a manner which reflects the population
sizes and prior event rates, ai/bi = λ0i, of the counties. That is, when there is heterogeneity
in the population sizes, we should expect the Poisson-gamma model to produce synthetic
data with greater utility than the multinomial-Dirichlet model with an equivalent risk of
disclosure. Furthermore, when we allow the model to use existing prior information regarding
heterogeneity in the event rates, additional gains in utility should be expected.
To put these results in context, we consider the extent to which the urban-rural disparity
and comparison of rates in New Mexico and New York can be distorted by the data synthesis
process under Scenario 4. In Figure 2(a), we compare the heart disease mortality rate of urban
counties to that from rural counties. Because there are far more rural counties than urban
counties, the multinomial-Dirichlet model allocates a disproportionate number of deaths to
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Figure 2: Illustration of properties of the utility of the synthetic data. Synthetic data
generated from the Poisson-gamma model are smoothed toward the state-specific averages.
rural counties, thus dramatically inflating their rates. In contrast, the Poisson-gamma model
with smoothing toward state-specific averages produces rate estimates for both urban and
rural counties that are on par with the truth. Similarly, Figure 2(b) displays a comparison of
estimated rates for New York versus New Mexico. Because New York has 14 times the adult
population of New Mexico and has only 2 times as many counties, the multinomial-Dirichlet
model produces rate estimates for New Mexico that are approximately 14/2 = 7 times
greater than those in New York. This is again in contrast to the Poisson-gamma model with
smoothing toward the state-specific averages, which (by design) produces accurate estimates
for all . Thus, while synthetic data produced by the Poisson-gamma model may yield more
conservative inference (particularly when smoothing toward the national average), synthetic
data from the multinomial-Dirichlet model may yield estimates that exhibit both Type-M
(magnitude) and Type-S (sign) errors (Gelman and Tuerlinckx, 2000).
4 Discussion
In this paper, we have generalized the approach of Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) for generating
differentially private synthetic data from the multinomial-Dirichlet setting to a more flexible
Poisson-gamma setting. In addition to decomposing a collection of abstract probability
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parameters into a function of interpretable offset (e.g., population size) and rate parameters,
the Poisson-gamma setting also grants data stewards more control over the utility of the
synthetic data. As we have demonstrated via simulation and proved mathematically, the
Poisson-gamma approach can be equivalent to the multinomial-Dirichlet approach in the
most simple of settings (equal population sizes and prior beliefs) while its added flexibility
can yield far greater utility in more realistic settings.
One note that we have glossed over to this point is the notion that this approach assumes
that (and conditions on) certain pieces of information are safe to be disclosed. In particular,
we have assumed in our simulation study that the total number of deaths due to a certain cause
of death in a particular age group is known (i.e., y·). This implies that we are comfortable
with an intruder knowing that a given individual died of this cause of death at a certain
age but not which county the individual lived in. In other settings, however, an agency
may assume that demographic attributes such as an individual’s age, race, sex, and county
are known, but that their cause of death is unknown. In this scenario, the presentation
described here could simply be reframed to synthesize the number of individuals assigned
to each ICD-10 code within these demographic strata – because the total number of deaths
occurring in each strata would likely be small, differential privacy could be satisfied with
relatively noninformative priors even for small . This provides yet another lever for agencies
to manipulate to improve the utility of the data they release.
Another avenue for improving the utility of the synthetic data produced by the proposed
Poisson-gamma model would be to consider the (, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy frame-
work proposed by Machanavajjhala et al. (2008). As described in Section 2.1, satisfying
-differential privacy requires bounding the maximal risk, which occurs when yi = 1 in the
true data and all z· events are assigned to the ith cell in the synthetic data. Because the
probability of sampling such an extreme synthetic dataset is very small, Machanavajjhala et al.
(2008) proposed an algorithm for defining α such that the probability of sampling a synthetic
dataset, z, that violates (1) was less than a user-defined δ > 0. While it is possible to derive a
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similar framework for the Poisson-gamma model proposed here, we believe an approach that
truncates the range of each zi based on its prior predictive distribution, p (zi | ai, bi), could be
more intuitive to implement and result in a true differentially private mechanism (i.e., δ = 0).
Finally, we would be remiss to not discuss the relationship between the proposed Poisson-
gamma model and more conventional approaches for satisfying differential privacy — i.e.,
those that sanitize the truth by adding differentially private noise. In particular, one might
suspect that such approaches would struggle when there is substantial heterogeneity in the
counts because the impact of adding noise to yi = 0 events from a small ni is much different
than adding the same amount of noise to a large yi′ out of a similarly large ni′ — i.e., the
noise added is not itself a function of the number of events or the population size. One
compromise might be the model-based differentially private synthesis (MODIPS) approach of
Liu (2016) in which posterior distributions are sanitized by adding differentially private noise
to the sufficient statistics. In particular, the approach of Liu (2016) could easily be extended
to the Poisson-gamma setting in which the posterior distribution in (7) would be replaced by
λ∗i | yi ∼ Gamma (ai + f (yi) , bi + ni) , (18)
where f (yi) = yi + ei and ei is differentially private noise. While the ai + ei in (18) will surely
be less than the ai required to satisfy -differential privacy in (15) — suggesting the potential
for improved utility — the drawback of (18) is that E [λ∗i | yi] = (ai + yi + ei) / (bi + ni) is
not a weighted average the crude rate from the data, yi/ni, and the prior expected value,
ai/bi. As a result, the benefit of using less informative priors could potentially be negated
by smoothing λ∗i toward (ai + ei) /bi. Alternatively, we could sanitize the gamma prior
in (6) itself. For instance, instead of smoothing the λi toward their state-specific averages —
λ0;si =
∑
j∈Ssi yj/
∑
j∈Ssi nj, where Ss denotes the set of counties belonging to state s — we
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could let b∗i = ai/λ
∗
0;si
and λi ∼ Gamma (ai, b∗i ) where
λ∗0;si =
∑
j∈Ssi yj + esi∑
j∈Ssi nj
(19)
and esi is differentially private noise. A key benefit of this approach would be that the noise
in (19) would be added to larger, aggregate counts, thereby resulting in less degradation
to the utility of the model. Nevertheless, the focus of this paper is not to argue which
approach is optimal (a status that is likely application specific), but rather to demonstrate
the conditions in which the Poisson-gamma model satisfies differential privacy.
Issues with the utility of differentially private synthetic data are not new. In particular,
Charest (2010) highlighted the inherent bias in (16) for the multinomial-Dirichlet model due
to the tendency to let αi = α for all i. That is, unlike in most Bayesian statistical approaches
for generating synthetic data, prior distributions in differentially private synthesizers tend to
be designed solely to satisfy differential privacy for a certain  rather than represent one’s
prior beliefs or best capture the data’s complex dependence structures. To overcome this
bias, Charest (2010) proposed what essentially amounts to a measurement error model in
which the synthetic data are treated as a noisy version of the truth and the end-user attempts
to estimate the truth from the synthetic data — i.e., make inference on p (y | z,α). The
drawback of this approach, however, is that it assumes (a) that end-users are aware of this
bias, (b) that end-users are savvy enough to do such preprocessing of the public-use data,
and (c) that agencies would disclose the details of their data synthesizers — including the
level of  used — to accurately recover or approximate the true data.
While such techniques can be effective for overcoming the bias induced by sanitizing
data for public-use, the proposed work is intended as a step toward differentially private
synthetic data that require no preprocessing on the part of would-be data users. Specifically,
the Poisson-gamma model has parameters to control the informativeness of the model, a, and
parameters that dictate what the model smooths estimates toward, b. As illustrated here,
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this framework allowed us to account for heterogeneity in both population sizes and prior
event rates to yield synthetic data with substantially improved utility. In our future work,
we aim to develop further extensions of formal privacy guarantees to nonconjugate models,
thereby permitting the creation and dissemination of differentially private synthetic data that
benefit from more conventional spatial and spatiotemporal model structures like those used
by Quick and Waller (2018). In the meantime, we believe that utility can be improved via
truncating synthetic counts to reasonable ranges and stratification; e.g., synthesizing counts
based on demographics such as age group, race/ethnicity, and sex and by geographic regions
like the Census Regions and Divisions.
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